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14 April 1961

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
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Republic of the Congo



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Map Page

Congo: Tshombé's hegemony in Katanga politics apparently is being challenged by tribal traditionalists led by Interior Minister Munongo. Under a proposed constitutional amendment published on 12 April and immediately denounced by Tshombé as illegal, most of the president's executive functions would be transferred to a prime minister. Munongo, who is strongly opposed to Belgians and is unfriendly to whites in general, is the likely candidate for the new post. The tribalists dominate the legislature and are influential in most areas of Katanga, and Tshombé, who seems to retain the support of his Belgian military and civilian advisers, may be faced with a breakup of the tribal coalition which brought him to power. [redacted] 25X1

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Portugal: The 13 April cabinet changes, and particularly the removal of Defense Minister Moniz, represent a rejection by Salazar of demands for liberalization of Portugal's internal and African policies. Moniz was the principal advocate within the cabinet of such liberalization. Salazar has taken the defense portfolio himself, appointed a comparative unknown as army minister, and promoted to the Overseas Ministry the previous undersecretary, the 38-year-old Adriano Moreira, a vigorous defender of the government's "stand firm" policies in Africa. [redacted] Salazar's move may now provoke a reaction from Moniz, who recently intimated to US officials that he had the support of most top officers for his demand that Salazar either change his policies or face a military takeover. [redacted]

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France-Algeria: The American Embassy in Paris feels De Gaulle's 11 April press conference posed to the Algerians the clear alternatives of future friendship with France or a complete rupture, with independence in any case, and foreshadowed the future development of France as a noncolonial power. The US consul general in Algiers points out that

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De Gaulle's references to the FLN leaders, while far from granting them the role of exclusive spokesmen for Algeria, do attribute to them a "special" responsibility. The consul general feels that this may be sufficient to bring the FLN to peace talks with the French. The rebel provisional Algerian government has not yet commented officially on De Gaulle's remarks and may be experiencing difficulty in formulating a response. [REDACTED]

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Communist China - India: [REDACTED]

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Peiping has never before submitted a political dispute to arbitration. In the present case, however, the Chinese may see definite tactical advantages in the move. They probably reason that Nehru, who has consistently refused Chinese offers to compromise the border dispute, would in all likelihood reject an arbitration offer. The Indian leader insists that the border problem has grown out of Chinese aggression. The Chinese would try to present an Indian rejection as a refusal to join with Peiping in a move to relax tensions in the area.

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Japan-Korea: Repatriation of Korean residents in Japan to North Korea will resume on 14 April but probably will no longer be a major irritant in relations between Japan and South Korea. The post-Rhee government in Seoul has tended to ignore the repatriation question in negotiations to settle outstanding problems with Tokyo. Pyongyang suspended the repatriation program last February, presumably because the North Koreans were embarrassed by the drop in the number

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of Koreans seeking repatriation. Pyongyang, however, has been under pressure to resume the program both from the Japanese, who want to reduce the size of the [redacted] Korean community in Japan, and from its own front group in Japan which has warned of a major prestige loss if repatriation was not resumed. About 10 percent of the 600,000 Korean residents in Japan have gone to North Korea since the program was initiated in December 1959. [redacted]

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(Briefs continued on following page)

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**SELECTED INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS AND ESTIMATES**

(Available during the preceding week)

Probable Political Developments and the Internal Security Situation in Colonial Africa South of the Sahara Over the Next Few Years. USIB. NIE 60/70-61. 11 April 1961. [REDACTED] 25X1

Probable Intelligence Warning of Soviet Attack on the US. USIB. NIE 11-61. 6 April 1961. 0036854. [REDACTED] 25X1

Attitudes of Key World Powers on Disarmament and Arms Control: Assessment of the Underlying Motivations and Objectives of the USSR, Communist China, France, the UK, West Germany, and Canada. USIB. NIE 4-2-61. 6 April 1961.

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Situation in the Congo

The proposed changes in the Katanga constitution would subordinate the executive to the legislature--an obvious effort to check Tshombé's freewheeling. An earlier resolution requesting the nomination of a prime minister passed the lower house by a vote of 34 to 6, and Tshombé's opponents probably command a similar majority in the Grand Council of chiefs. Many of these leaders reportedly object that Tshombé's ministers have voted themselves salary increases without increasing the stipends of the chiefs; most of them, moreover, apparently oppose Tshombé's alliance with the Belgians.

Tshombé has rebutted this attack with a plea that strong executive rule is necessary in view of the threats to Katanga's independence. He further asserted that the legislature cannot unilaterally promulgate a constitutional change, since the president's approval is necessary as well as that of two thirds of the lower house.

Most Belgians in Katanga believe that Tshombé will weather this challenge, although one of them told the American consul in Elisabethville that he thought the Katanga president was "used up" as a leader. In addition, the Belgians reportedly are uneasy over the influence which tribalists such as Munongo can wield in the countryside, where many tribesmen are growing dissatisfied with the influence Belgium in exerting in Katanga.

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Salazar Drops Portuguese Defense Minister
In Cabinet Reshuffle

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[General Manuel Gomes de Araujo, the chief of general staff of the armed forces, is considered exceptionally loyal to Salazar, and both he and the new army minister, Brigadier Mario Silva, are generally regarded as members of the extreme right-wing group of former Defense Minister Santos Costa. Santos Costa is a bitter rival of Moniz, and Salazar may intend to return him to the Defense Ministry shortly.]

[A further indication that the regime will continue to take a firm stand against changes in the overseas provinces appears in a recent statement made by French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville to Ambassador Elbrick in Lisbon on 8 April. He said that a long talk with Salazar and Foreign Minister Mathias revealed no sign of any "give" or new ideas for a solution of Portugal's African problems. Couve subsequently implied to US Ambassador Gavin in Paris that Salazar would have to go before there could be significant changes in Portugal's African policies.]

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Reactions to De Gaulle's Remarks on Algeria

The US Embassy in Paris notes that De Gaulle carefully avoided questions of detail and procedure but feels that he has clarified his general intentions for Algeria once and for all and has offered the rebels a unique opportunity to come to terms. In his follow-up provincial speaking tour, De Gaulle declared on 12 April that he has been and still is offering Algeria peace and cooperation and said, "Let the other side want this and it will be done." On 13 April, he made another overture to the rebels saying, "We want to settle the rebellion by extending our hand to those who, up to now, have not wished to accept it, and in such a manner that it will be possible for them to construct the new Algeria, and for us, if they are willing, to help them do it."

Although De Gaulle's statements are designed to demonstrate French willingness to seek a reasonable solution, he is still a long way from offering to deal with the Provisional Algerian Government on anything resembling a government-to-government basis. He continues to speak only in terms of self-determination by all of the Algerian people after a rebel agreement to stop the fighting. He also threatened that an independent Algeria not closely associated with France would be left to face economic chaos and might also have to submit to partition.

This type of presentation may revive latent discord within the PAG. The rebels had reached their decision to go to Evian in the first place by glossing over such long-range problems, and they were hoping for clarification of a few points of immediate interest to them. The rebels may view De Gaulle's reiteration of these positions at this time as an attempt to limit the scope of negotiations and force a settlement which would provide for continued French influence. Powerful elements within the PAG could argue that no basis exists for successful negotiations within such a context. More moderate elements, however, in view of what they consider improved relations with the US and possibly the UK--a British parliamentary delegation met with rebel Premier Ferhat Abbas on 10 April, apparently on British initiative--may consider it unwise to refuse to meet with the

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French. The rebels are reportedly continuing attempts to establish through secret contacts a basis for opening talks.

The early reaction in Algeria to De Gaulle's statements has been unfavorable. The settler ultras are likely to see in this week's speeches a full confirmation of their fears that De Gaulle is renouncing the maintenance of French sovereignty in Algeria and they will probably step up their bombings and other "counterterrorist" activities. The Moslem population, which had been looking toward an early end to hostilities, is disappointed that De Gaulle did not make more specific concessions to the PAG and fears an adverse effect on prospects for negotiations.

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Korean Repatriation From Japan to North Korea Resumed

The repatriation agreement, concluded in mid-1959, is a private agreement between the Japanese and North Korean Red Cross Societies, but has the official backing of both governments. Tokyo has long sought a means for solving the problem of its Korean minority, which has a high crime rate and has required heavy government assistance.

The Japanese failed, however, in efforts to persuade President Syngman Rhee's government that the program was based on humanitarian principles and would be entirely voluntary. Rhee reacted by severing trade with Japan and breaking off negotiations for an over-all settlement of Japanese - South Korean differences. With the ouster of the Rhee regime and the actual implementation of the program, official and public outrage in South Korea subsided. The Chang Myon government opposes the program in principle, but in practice has tended to ignore it. Despite the friendlier atmosphere in negotiations between Tokyo and Seoul in the post-Rhee period, however, major differences on issues other than the repatriation problem have prevented substantive progress.

More than 54,000 Koreans have been sent from Japan to North Korea aboard the two repatriation ships made available by the USSR. There is now a backlog of 17,000 applications for repatriation, but many Koreans are likely to renege before departure time, and it is doubtful that the sailings, resuming on 14 April, will reach the previous average of 1,000 repatriates weekly.

[Pyongyang has apparently experienced difficulty in resettling repatriates, who find living conditions in North Korea less appealing than advertised by Chosen Soren, the Korean Communist front in Japan. There are reports that dissatisfied repatriates have refused to accept job assignments and have openly criticized the Communist regime. Many have written to relatives and friends in Japan of shortages in daily necessities and warned them not to apply for repatriation. Pyongyang has imposed strict censorship on all mail, but elaborate private codes]

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[redacted] have been devised and reports on conditions continue to trickle out.]

Registration for sailings fell off sharply late last fall and Pyongyang suspended the program in early February, using its concern over a "flu epidemic" as an excuse. Chosen Soren, working diligently to build up a backlog of repatriates, has warned Pyongyang that North Korean prestige will suffer in the Japanese Korean community unless the program is speedily resumed.

Despite a labor shortage in North Korea, repatriation has undoubtedly lost much of its political and economic appeal to Pyongyang. The regime has probably come to view the disaffected repatriates as an increasing liability, and probably would like to find a way to discontinue the program if it could do so without damaging North Korean prestige among Koreans in Japan.

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
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